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NOT SO GOOD: THE CLASSIFICATION OF
“SMART GOODS” UNDER UCC ARTICLE 2
Chadwick L. Williams*
INTRODUCTION
Refrigerators can now tweet.1 Today, almost sixty years after the
states widely adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the line
between goods and services is more blurred than ever.2 When the
UCC was drafted, a good was the simple opposite of a service.3 A
good was something “movable” and tangible,4 and a service was not.5
Article 2 of the UCC, which governs sales, limits its scope to goods.6
However, because Article 2 was drafted long before the proliferation
of so-called “smart goods,”7 courts continuously struggle to
determine when a smart good falls within Article 2’s scope.8 Courts
have developed different tests over the years to deal with contracts
*
J.D. Candidate, 2018, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank Professor Mark
Budnitz for helping me develop this topic and Professor Corneill Stephens for fostering my interest in
contracts and the UCC. I would also like to thank my girlfriend Kayla and my family for their constant
support and encouragement throughout this process. Finally, thank you to all the members of Georgia
State’s Law Review who helped review and edit this Note.
1. Sam Byford, Tweet My Fridge: The Bizarre Home Appliances of CES, THE VERGE (Jan. 16,
2013, 9:31 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/1/16/3867932/evernote-on-your-fridge-ces-homeappliance-insanity [https://perma.cc/VT8K-364R].
2. Lee Kissman, Revised Article 2 and Mixed Goods/Information Transactions: Implications for
Courts, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 561, 571 (2004) (“[B]ecause emerging technologies have become
increasingly intertwined, some authors point out that it is becoming increasingly difficult to draw a clear
distinction between embedded and non-embedded software, even for computer scientists.”).
3. See Eric Goldman, UCC 2B/UCITA Resurrected–ALI’s Principles of the Law of Software
Contracts,
TECH.
&
MARKETING
L.
BLOG
(June
1,
2007),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2007/06/ucc_2bucita_res.htm
[https://perma.cc/TTU7-KBFK].
Law professor Eric Goldman writes that because Article 2 was principally drafted in the 1950s, it was
designed to “govern the sale of tangible items, not software . . . . Accordingly, Article 2 fits awkwardly
when applied to ‘intangible goods’ like software.” Id.; U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1977).
4. U.C.C. § 2-105(1).
5. U.C.C. § 2-102.
6. Id.
7. Goldman, supra note 3.
8. See Jean Braucher, When Your Refrigerator Orders Groceries Online and Your Car Dials 911
After an Accident: Do We Really Need New Law for the World of Smart Goods?, 8 WASH U. J.L. &
POL’Y 241, 242 (2002).
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containing a mixture of goods and services,9 but those tests produce
questionable results when applied to smart goods.10 In the late 1990s,
drafters attempted to address these issues with an ill-fated addition to
Article 2 that ultimately failed.11 Still today, as software and tangible
goods become more intertwined,12 software’s legal status remains a
fundamental, yet unanswered, question.13 This unresolved question
impacts consumers directly;14 whether a contract falls within the
scope of Article 2 affects customers’ available warranties and
remedies.15
The following Note discusses the classification difficulties posed
by modern goods with embedded software and services. Part I
explains the history of the UCC, the past efforts to address the
difficulties, and the issues that still remain. Part II analyzes previous
attempts to resolve the issue and courts’ current solutions to these
classification difficulties. Part III proposes a contemporary solution
to these modern challenges and discusses how such a solution might
be implemented.
I. Background
In the early 1940s, two organizations, the National Conference of
Commissioners and the American Law Institute (ALI), joined
together to develop a comprehensive body of law to govern
commercial transactions.16 This commercial code embraced all
9. See YVONNE W. ROSMARIN & JONATHAN SHELDON, SALES OF GOODS AND SERVICES 158–64
(2d ed. 1989).
10. Spencer Gottlieb, Installation Failure: How the Predominant Purpose Test Has Perpetuated
Software’s Uncertain Legal Status Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 113 MICH. L. REV. 739, 741
(2015); Holly K. Towle, Enough Already: It Is Time to Acknowledge that UCC Article 2 Does Not
Apply to Software and Other Information, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 531, 555 (2011).
11. See Amelia H. Boss, Taking UCITA on the Road: What Lessons Have We Learned?, 7 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 167, 168 (Fall 2001); William H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong,
11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 131, 135 (2009); Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009,
1011–12 (2002).
12. Kissman, supra note 2, at 571.
13. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 741.
14. Walter D. Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code in the United States, 12 INT’L. & COMP.
L.Q. 226, 234 (1963).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 229.
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modern developments in other attempted uniform sales codes17 and
created new provisions to address recognized commercial
problems.18 If adopted by the states, this collection was intended to
replace the common law of contracts for commercial transactions.19
This collection was the UCC.20 Following its initial introduction, the
UCC went through many drafts and redrafts.21 Finally, after years of
debate and revision,22 the official edition of the UCC was published
in October 1952.23 By 1967, forty-nine states had adopted the UCC
to some degree.24
With the states’ mass adoption of the UCC,25 the UCC preempted
the common law of contracts whenever the UCC applied.26 Article 2
of the Code applies to the sale of goods.27 A “good” is defined as “all
things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable
at the time of identification to the contract for sale . . . .”28 Therefore,
Article 2 governs the enforcement of any contract concerning
tangible “things” which are “movable.”29 The application of Article 2
is simple when the contract in controversy exclusively concerns
goods. However, contracts are often mixed, with services and goods
intertwined within the agreement.30 The Code is silent on the
treatment of mixed goods and service contracts;31 these “hybrid
contracts” have troubled courts since the adoption of the UCC.32 To
deal with this issue, courts have developed several different tests.33
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Malcolm, supra note 14, at 229–30.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 230.
24. William B. Davenport, Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey-1967, 22 BUS. LAW. 707, 707
(1966).
25. Id.
26. AmSouth Bank v. Tice, 923 So.2d 1060, 1065 (Ala. 2005).
27. U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
28. U.C.C. § 2-105(1).
29. Id.
30. See ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 9, at 158–64.
31. See id. at 159.
32. See id. at 158–64.
33. Id. at 158.
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A. The Hybrid Tests
The primary issue courts face with hybrid contracts is determining
whether Article 2 applies,34 and, if so, how much of the contract falls
within the Article 2 scope.35 The test used differs by jurisdiction.36
1. The Predominant Factor Test
A majority of jurisdictions use the predominant factor test to
resolve hybrid contract scope issues.37 Even if a contract contains a
mixture of goods and services, if its “predominant factor, [its] thrust,
[its] purpose, reasonably stated, is . . . a transaction of sale,” then
Article 2 of the UCC applies.38 Once the court determines the
“predominant purpose” of the contract, either the whole contract is
governed by Article 2 or none of it is.39
Courts analyze several factors to determine if a hybrid contract’s
“thrust” and “purpose” are truly a sale of goods.40 The factors are (1)
the language of the contract; (2) the manner of billing; (3) the
allocation of costs; and (4) the nature of the final delivered product.41
34. Towle, supra note 10, at 555.
35. See Ann Lousin, Cases on the Scope of Article 2, 46 BUS. LAW. 1855, 1861–66 (1991).
36. See ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 9, at 159.
37. See id.
38. Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that a bowling alley’s contract
with a bowling equipment dealer for bowling equipment, installation, and lane resurfacing was
predominantly a sale of goods).
39. Id. at 959.
40. Insul-Mark Midwest, Inc. v. Modern Materials, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 550, 554 (Ind. 1993)
(“Specifically, one looks to the terms describing the performance required of the parties, and the words
used to describe the relationship between the parties.”).
41. BMC Indus. v. Barth Indus., 160 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). The court stated:
Courts are frequently faced . . . with contracts involving both goods and
services—so-called “hybrid” contracts. Most courts follow the
“predominant factor” test to determine whether such hybrid contracts are
transactions in goods, and therefore covered by the UCC, or transactions in
services, and therefore excluded . . . . Under this test, the court determines
whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably
stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved (e.g.,
contract with artist for painting) or is a transaction of sale, with labor
incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a water heater in a
bathroom) . . . . Although courts generally have not found any single factor
determinative in classifying a hybrid contract as one for goods or services,
courts find several aspects of a contract particularly significant. First, the
language of the contract itself provides insight into whether the parties
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First, if the contract contains language like “purchase order,” then
courts consider that contractual language to be more indicative of an
Article 2 transaction in goods.42 Second, if the contract mandates a
lump sum payment at delivery, that language is more indicative of a
contract for goods than services.43 Third, it is more indicative of a
contract for goods if most of the costs are in exchange for the
tangible portion of the contract.44 Finally, if the final product
delivered is movable and tangible, the contract would likely fall
within the scope of Article 2.45
believed the goods or services were the more important element of their
agreement. Contractual language that refers to the transaction as a
“purchase,” for example, or identifies the parties as the “buyer” and
“seller,” indicates that the transaction is for goods rather than services . . . .
Courts also examine the manner in which the transaction was billed; when
the contract price does not include the cost of services, or the charge for
goods exceeds that for services, the contract is more likely to be for
goods . . . . Movable goods is another hallmark of a contract for goods
rather than services. The UCC’s definition of goods makes clear the
importance of mobility in determining whether a contract is for goods . . . .
Id. at 1329–30.
42. Id. at 1330–31.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1330. Even among the courts that apply the same test, results often conflict. One court
applying the predominant factor test stated:
There was no proof of defective goods. There was, however, proof of
defective services performed in relation to the goods. The warranty
provisions of [the UCC] apply to services when the sale is primarily one of
goods and services are necessary to insure that those goods are
merchantable and fit for the ordinary purpose. [Therefore, Article 2 applies
to the sale and installation of a swimming pool.]
Riffe v. Black, 548 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Ky. 1977). Another court, however, held the opposite concerning
a very similar transaction, stating:
The initial terms of the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant
provided merely that the defendant would “furnish all labor and
materials . . . and to construct pool . . . furnish and install swimming pool
with vinyl liner. Complete with built in fence and stairs” . . . . In the present
case it is obviously impossible, or extremely difficult to effect a separation
of the labor or services from the material and equipment. The two
component parts do not readily permit that cleavage. [Therefore, Article 2
does not apply to the sale and installation of a swimming pool.]
Gulash v. Stylarama, 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 112–13 (1975). Unfortunately, this is the result of a balancing
test; it gives the court more discretion than it would ordinarily have with a firm rule. Some
commentators, however, claim that courts selectively choose factors that lead them to apply the UCC,
particularly in consumer contracts, seeking to protect the consumer with the implied remedies provided
by the Code. Alternatively, the conflicting results may simply result from different courts prioritizing
the factors differently.
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2. The Gravamen Test
The gravamen test is a simpler alternative to the predominant
factor test.46 Under this test, the court looks at the entire contract in
the context of the facts and circumstances of the case.47 If the hybrid
contract, in light of the dispute, seems like its essence was for the
sale of a good, then Article 2 applies.48 If the contract, in light of the
dispute, seems like it was actually for the contracting of services with
some goods implicated, Article 2 does not apply.49 In the gravamen
test, like the predominant factor test, either all of the contract is

One court prioritizing contract language stated: “The language thus employed is that peculiar to
goods, not services. It speaks of ‘equipment,’ and of lanes free from ‘defects in workmanship and
materials.’ The rendition of services does not comport with such terminology.” Bonebrake v. Cox, 499
F.2d 951, 958 (8th Cir. 1974). Another court, prioritizing manner of billing, stated: “Although [the
original contract] included some service trips for inspection, startup, instruction of plant personnel, and
observation, the contract was predominantly for the supply of equipment. The later communications
from [the party] specifically noted that most service items would be in addition to the contract price.”
WesTech Eng’g, Inc. v. Clearwater Constr., Inc. 835 S.W.2d 190, 197 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). Yet another
court, prioritizing allocation of costs, stated: “The projected total, excluding bonus, is therefore
approximately $59,828, of which [over 90% is allocated to] labor . . . . Based on this evidence, we
conclude that this was primarily a service contract.” Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 434 N.W.2d 97,
161 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
46. J.O. Hooker & Sons, Inc. v. Roberts Cabinet Co., 683 So.2d 396, 400 (Miss. 1996). In a case
regarding cabinets, the court held that the UCC did not apply because the dispute involved the service
aspect (disposing of cabinets) of the contract rather than the goods aspect (the new cabinets). Id. The
court stated:
It is very often the case that a construction contract will involve the
furnishing of goods by a subcontractor, and this Court holds that, in such a
mixed transaction, whether or not the contract should be interpreted under
the UCC or our general contract law should depend upon the nature of the
contract and also upon whether the dispute in question primarily concerns
the goods furnished or the services rendered under the contract. The present
case clearly does not concern the cabinets manufactured, but rather the
refusal of [one party] to assume duties which [the other party] contractually
obligated itself to perform. This Court would not hesitate to apply Article 2
if the present case involved, for example, a dispute of the quality of the
cabinets, but the present case is in actuality a fairly standard contract
dispute involving delegation of duties under a contract and the right to
unilaterally rescind said contract. The fact that goods were furnished in the
present contract has no bearing on the legal analysis involved, given that
the dispute in this case clearly concerns the service aspect of this mixed
transaction.
Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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governed by Article 2 or none of it is.50 Although the majority of
courts use the predominant factor test, courts remain divided on
which test best applies Article 2 to contracts only partially within its
scope.51
B. The Life and Death of the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act
Contracts for the sale of software challenged the courts even more
than the hybrid contracts that came before.52 A few decades after the
wide adoption of Article 2 marked the dawn of the computer age.53
Courts attempted to apply the same hybrid tests to contracts for the
sale of software.54 Results varied greatly.55 Although software was
technically tangible and movable in compact disc form, the true
essence of a contract for software was for the information on the
tangible disc.56 Courts continue to struggle to consistently apply the
traditional hybrid tests to software contracts.57
In 1999, recognizing the widespread confusion software was
causing,58 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the ALI promulgated the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA) to govern transactions in
computer information.59 The UCITA initially began as a proposal for
an addition to the UCC, which would be known as Article 2B.60
50. J.O. Hooker & Sons, Inc., 683 So.2d at 400.
51. See ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 9, at 161.
52. Goldman, supra note 3.
53. See Erik Sandberg-Diment, Personal Computers; Hardware Review: Apple Weighs In With
Macintosh, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 24, 1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/24/science/personalcomputers-hardware-review-apple-weighs-in-with-macintosh.html
[https://perma.cc/T5VF-62LC]
(describing the Apple Macintosh computer and providing insight to the early days of personal
computing).
54. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 739.
55. Id. at 748 (“Balancing tests provide courts with a high degree of discretion, which can make the
tests ‘unavoidably vague’ and ‘loosely defined,’ leading to ‘inconsistent results.’”).
56. Kissman, supra note 2, at 575 (“Some courts have found that Article 2 directly applies when
software is sold in the form of a disk or other tangible and moveable medium.”).
57. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 748.
58. Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 459, 461
(2000).
59. Id.
60. Boss, supra note 11, at 176.
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Displeased, the ALI withdrew early in the process.61 The UCITA’s
development continued separately from the UCC.62
The UCITA attempted to address the software contract problem
by adjusting the scope of Article 2.63 If the UCITA was adopted, it
would apply to “computer information transactions.”64 A computer
information transaction is “an agreement or the performance of it to
create, modify, transfer, or license computer information or
informational rights in computer information.”65 Computer
information is “information in electronic form which is obtained
from or through the use of a computer or which is in a form capable
of being processed by a computer.”66 The UCITA expands the term
“computer information” to include “a copy of the information and
any documentation or packaging associated with the copy.”67
Therefore, if the UCITA was adopted, all software would be removed
from the scope of Article 2 and be governed by the UCITA.68
However, the UCITA was widely considered overly complex and
poorly conceived.69 Additionally, competing interest groups created a
deadlock in further UCITA adoption.70
As a result of its wide criticism, only Virginia and Maryland
adopted the UCITA.71 Since then, Iowa, North Carolina, Vermont,
and West Virginia actually adopted anti-UCITA legislation,72

61. Daniel Uhlfelder, UCITA: Coming to a Statehouse Near You, UBIQUITY (Nov. 30, 2000),
http://ubiquity.acm.org/article.cfm?id=355133 [https://perma.cc/EA8Q-79JR]. Several years in a row,
the ALI refused to put the UCITA on the agenda for approval at its annual meetings. Boss, supra note
11, at 177. The ALI decided to take no final action because of concerns about the architecture and scope
of the proposal. Id. The ALI was also concerned about its overall coherence and clarity. Id.
62. Boss, supra note 11, at 177.
63. Scott, supra note 11, at 1013.
64. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 103(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
65. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 102(a)(11).
66. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 102(a)(10).
67. Id.
68. Henning, supra note 11, at 136 (“Going into 1999, Articles 2 and 2B had complementary scope
provisions; that is, products outside the scope of Article 2 were within the scope of Article 2B, and vice
versa.”).
69. Boss, supra note 11, at 199 (“Its sheer length and complexity makes UCITA a difficult act to
understand, even for those who are familiar with its provisions.”).
70. Scott, supra note 11, at 1050 n.129.
71. Goldman, supra note 3.
72. Boss, supra note 11, at 175 n.19.
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nullifying any choice of law provisions applying the UCITA.73 In
2003, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws announced that it would no longer seek further adoptions of the
UCITA.74 As a result, there is no national consensus on whether
software is a good or a service.75 Software’s legal status remains a
fundamental, yet unanswered, question.76
C. The Dawn of the Smart Good
In recent years, a new layer of ambiguity has emerged in the world
of hybrid contracts. The distinction between good and service
continues to blur as technology develops.77 Today, goods can have
integrated software78 and services.79 Some goods now have software
embedded in them; these types of goods are known as “smart
goods.”80 Examples include a car with a computer chip controlling its
automatic braking system81 and a printer with integrated software.82
The classic hybrid tests of years past are becoming less capable of
classifying modern goods.83 The classification of goods has a huge
impact on the remedies available to the injured party.84 As goods
become smarter, “new thinking is needed and lines will need to be
drawn to determine how to treat the goods containing . . . embedded
software.”85
73. Id.
74. Henning, supra note 11, at 136.
75. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 741.
76. Id.
77. Kissman, supra note 2, at 571.
78. Id.
79. See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet Of Things: Article 2 of the UCC and
Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 840 (2016). Amazon sells a product called the Amazon Dash. Id. The
only function of the button is to reorder a product when pressed using Amazon’s Dash Replenishment
Service. Id. Without the service, the Dash is useless. Id.
80. Braucher, supra note 8, at 241.
81. Boss, supra note 11, at 187 n.54.
82. See Brennan, supra note 58, at 496.
83. See Goldman, supra note 3.
84. Susan Nycum, Liability for Malfunction of a Computer Program, 7 RUTGERS COMPUTER TECH.
& L.J. 1, 2 (1979). The author states “at this time no one knows for certain what law would govern a
contract for a computer program.” Id. She then examines the importance of this question in light of the
different remedies available depending on whether Article 2 of the UCC applies. Id.
85. Towle, supra note 10, at 558.
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II. Analysis
The theoretical classification of a smart good has a huge impact on
the consumer.86 The source of this effect is largely due to the nature
of the UCC,87 which conceptualizes contracts differently than
traditional common law.88 The common law of contracts, which
invokes the principle of caveat emptor, “let the buyer beware,”
provides little support to an unwitting consumer.89 The UCC dispels
this mentality and builds in a number of protections for a customer
dealing with a merchant.90 For example, instead of the principle of
caveat emptor, Article 2 creates several implied warranties
enforceable in every contract for the sale of goods.91
One of these warranties is the implied warranty of
merchantability,92 which guarantees that a consumer’s purchased
good will “pass without objection in the trade”93 and is “fit for the
ordinary purposes for which [it is] used.”94 Thus, under Article 2, a
customer may recover damages from a manufacturer if the good is
defective, even if the contract never assured the customer of its
quality.95 Under Article 2, these remedies include the difference in
value, personal injury, and property damage proximately resulting
from the breach of implied warranty.96 This is in stark contrast to the
common law of contracts, where the customer is left to fend for
himself during contract negotiations.97
86. Nycum, supra note 84, at 3.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Kissman, supra note 2, at 580; Caveat Emptor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
90. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
91. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315, 2-316 (creating, respectively, the implied warranty of
merchantability, the implied warranty for fitness for a particular purpose, and establishing the ways a
merchant may disclaim such warranties). Despite these implied warranties imposed on a merchant, it
may still disclaim those warranties. U.C.C. § 2-316. Instead of the burden resting on the customer to
insist on a warranty being created, this code scheme simply shifts the burden to the merchant. Id.
92. See U.C.C. § 2-314.
93. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a) (“(2) Goods, to be merchantable, must be at least such as: (a) pass without
objection in the trade under the contract description . . . .”).
94. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (“(2) Goods, to be merchantable, must be at least such as: . . . (c) are fit for
the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used . . . .”).
95. See U.C.C. § 2-314.
96. U.C.C. § 2-714 (2); Nycum, supra note 84, at 3.
97. See Bryan Hoynak, Filling in the Blank: Defining Breaches of Contract Excepted from
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Additionally, Article 2 allows parties without privity to sue a party
for damages resulting from a breach of implied warranty.98 Unlike
the common law of contracts, which requires some contractual
relationship to maintain a lawsuit,99 Article 2 creates potential
Discharge as Willful and Malicious Injuries to Property Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), 67 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 693, 700–01 (2010) (“The focus in contract law is on the promise that arises out of the
agreements between the contracting parties, whereas the focus in tort law is on the wrongs that result
from violations of court-created rules.”). One of the oldest examples of the principle of caveat emptor is
in Laidlaw v. Organ. In that case, the Supreme Court stated:
The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of extrinsic
circumstances, which might influence the price of the commodity, and
which was exclusively within the knowledge of the seller, ought to have
been communicated to the buyer? . . . The court is of the opinion that he
was not bound to communicate it.
Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S 178, 195 (1817). From there, contract law continued to allow sellers to not
disclose defects, as long as they did not lie to the buyer. Simone v. Homecheck Real Estate Servs., Inc.,
840 N.Y.S.2d 398, 400 (App. Div. 2007). In Simone v. Homecheck, a modern case concerning ordinary
contract law in the sale of land, the court stated:
New York adheres to the doctrine of caveat emptor and imposes no liability
on a seller for failing to disclose information regarding the premises when
the parties deal at arm’s length, unless there is some conduct on the part of
the seller which constitutes active concealment . . . . The mere silence of
the seller, without some act or conduct which deceived the buyer, does not
amount to concealment that is actionable as fraud . . . . To maintain a cause
of action to recover damages for active concealment in the context of a
fraudulent nondisclosure, the buyer must show, in effect, that the seller
thwarted the buyer’s efforts to fulfill the buyer’s responsibilities fixed by
the doctrine of caveat emptor.
Id. (holding that numerous structural and material defects in a home purchased by the plaintiffs could
not constitute a basis for action or damages by the buyer). This mentality is the opposite of the
protective scheme in the UCC, where the defect itself creates the liability for the merchant seller. The
seller need not say anything to be liable for his defective sale. The Official Comments of § 2-314 state:
The question when the warranty is imposed turns basically on the meaning
of the terms of the agreement as recognized in the trade. Goods delivered
under an agreement made by a merchant in a given line of trade must be of
a quality comparable to that generally acceptable in that line of trade under
the description or other designation of the goods used in the agreement.
The responsibility imposed rests on any merchant-seller.
U.C.C. § 2-314 (Official Comment 2).
98. U.C.C. § 2-318. There are two types of privity: horizontal privity and vertical privity. 3 MARY
ANNE FORAN, WILLISTON ON SALES § 22-10, at 350 (5th ed. 1994) [hereinafter WILLISTON ON SALES].
To maintain a suit under breach of implied warranty of merchantability through vertical privity, all that
is required is that the party suing is the intended beneficiary of the implied warranty. U.C.C. § 2-318
(Official Comment 2). In practice, most customers who use the goods for their ordinary purpose are
intended beneficiaries of the implied warranty of merchantability. Id. Accordingly, the ability to sue
really turns on horizontal privity. WILLISTON ON SALES § 22-10, at 351. Horizontal privity defines how
closely the injured party must be related to the purchaser of the defective good. Id. The UCC allows
states to have discretion in this area, defining three alternatives that fall along the continuum from close
relative to absolute stranger. Id. at 341.
99. See Hoynak, supra note 97, at 700–01.
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manufacturer liability for most consumers of consumer goods.100 For
example, a spouse injured by a defective product that her husband
bought from an electronics store could sue the manufacturer for a
breach of warranty. This dynamic is absent in the common law of
contracts, which seeks only to make injured parties to the contract
whole;101 contract law is compensatory, not punitive.102 Therefore,
the classification of smart goods is not a trivial matter. Unfortunately,
their classification remains ambiguous103 and no past or current
solution sufficiently addresses this issue.104
A. The UCITA: The One that Got Away
Article 2’s drafters struggled greatly with its scope.105 Initially, the
drafting committee attempted to broaden Article 2 to cover
software.106 Eventually though, for political reasons, they abandoned
these attempts in favor of independent statutory treatment of goods
and information.107 Article 2 would govern the sale of goods.108
Article 2B would govern information.109 Unfortunately, Article 2B
never garnered the necessary approval, was never widely adopted,
and was abandoned after being spun off into the UCITA.110
One major issue the UCITA’s drafters faced was the mixed
transaction.111 Unlike the hybrid contract, which contains a mix of
goods and services,112 a mixed transaction is one with an element of
information either embedded in or packaged with the goods.113
Supporters of the UCITA wanted it to cover the medium or tangible

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

U.C.C. § 2-318.
See Hoynak, supra note 97, at 701–02.
Id.
Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 741.
Id.
Boss, supra note 11, at 185.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 185–86.
Id. at 185.
Boss, supra note 11, at 185.
BMC Indus. v. Barth Indus., 160 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 1998).
Boss, supra note 11, at 187.
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good on which the information was delivered to the customer.114
Others insisted that smart goods must fall within the scope of Article
2, not the information-focused UCITA.115
The UCITA attempted to solve the problem of smart goods when
the drafters developed it in the late 1990s, well before the problem
was fully developed.116 Additionally, since Article 2 was approved
and adopted while Article 2B (UCITA) was abandoned, their scopes
conflict over smart goods.117 As a result, in the few states that
adopted the UCITA, courts use the gravamen test to determine which
law to apply.118 In these states, for mixed transactions, the court
simply applies either Article 2 or the UCITA, depending on the
gravamen of the dispute;119 if the dispute is regarding the tangible
portion of the smart good, the court will apply Article 2, and if the
dispute is regarding the information part of the good, the court will
apply the UCITA.120
This solution is untenable for two reasons: (1) the gravamen test is
unfit for this use long-term, as discussed below;121 and (2) only two
states have adopted the UCITA.122 The UCITA is practically dead,123
and there is little hope for any other states to ratify it.124 Plus, many
states have enacted legislation to plainly denounce the UCITA.125
The whole purpose of the UCC is to be uniform.126 Without a
uniform acceptance of the UCITA and its relationship with Article
2’s scope, the issue of smart good classification will not be
resolved.127

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
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Id.
Braucher, supra note 80, at 243; Brennan, supra note 58, at 461.
Braucher, supra note 80, at 242–43.
Kissman, supra note 2, at 571.
Id.
Id.
Towle, supra note 10, at 555; see infra text accompanying notes 161–70.
Braucher, supra note 80, at 243.
Boss, supra note 11, at 168.
Braucher, supra note 80, at 243.
Goldman, supra note 3.
Malcolm, supra note 14, at 229–30.
Boss, supra note 11, at 187–88.
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B. The Common Law: What We Are Stuck With
Courts originally developed the tests mentioned above to deal with
contracts involving a mix of goods and services.128 For example, if a
customer contracted with a builder to install a diving board for his
pool, the diving board on its own would be within the scope of
Article 2, but the service of its installation would not.129 After the
failure of the UCITA, courts have continued to use the preexisting
tests for determining whether the smart good in question falls within
the scope of Article 2.130
1. The Predominant Factor Test
The majority of courts apply the predominant factor test.131
Traditionally, courts used this test to determine whether the
128. See ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 9, at 158–62.
129. See Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 439, 441 (Md. 1983). Discussing Article 2, the
court stated:
Were the predominant purpose test mechanically to be applied to
the facts of this case, there would be no quality warranty implied as to the
diving board. But here the contract expressly states that [seller] agrees not
only to construct the swimming pool, but also to sell the related equipment
selected by the [buyer]. The [buyer is] described as “Buyer.” The diving
board itself is not structurally integrated into the swimming pool. [Seller]
offered the board as an optional accessory, just as [seller] offered the
options of purchasing a pool ladder or a sliding board. When identified to
the contract, the diving board was movable . . . . A number of
commentators have advocated a more policy oriented approach to
determining whether warranties of quality and fitness are implied with
respect to goods sold as part of a hybrid transaction in which service
predominates. To support their position, these commentators in general
emphasize loss shifting, risk distribution, consumer reliance and difficulties
in the proof of negligence. These concepts underlie strict liability in tort
....
....
Accordingly we hold that where, as part of a commercial
transaction, consumer goods are sold which retain their character as
consumer goods after completion of the performance promised to the
consumer, and where monetary loss or personal injury is claimed to have
resulted from a defect in the consumer goods, the [UCC sections] dealing
with implied warranties apply to the consumer goods, even if the
transaction is predominately one for the rendering of consumer services.
Id.
130. See Richard Raysman and Peter Brown, How the UCC Is Applied to Software Contracts, L.
TECH. NEWS, Mar. 9, 2011, at *1.
131. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 741.
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predominant purpose of the transaction was services or goods.132
When the sale of a good was the dominant purpose and labor was
incidentally involved, the court applying this test would hold that the
entire transaction was governed by Article 2.133
In the early days of this test’s application to software, the main
focus was on the hardware.134 At the time, customers had to go to a
store to purchase software applications.135 Software was most
commonly sold in boxes containing the software on a compact
disc.136 Once the courts decided that software was primarily tangible,
due to its medium, executing the predominant factor test led to
classifying software as a good.137 However, courts never reached a
consensus on whether software was actually a good.138 For example,
compare software to the sale of a book.139 If a customer buys a book
from a bookstore, reads it, and then decides that the story is not up to
the ordinary standards for that type of book, the customer cannot sue
under the implied warranty of merchantability.140 The intangible
content of the book is clearly outside the scope of Article 2.141
However, if that same customer’s book fell apart while reading it, the
customer could sue because the tangible good—the book itself—was
defective.142 Despite this analogy’s clear parallel with software, the
pressure of public policy143 and the overall novelty of software in the

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Towle, supra note 10, at 556.
See id. at 545.
Kissman, supra note 2, at 575.
Id.
Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 741.
Towle, supra note 10, at 556.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 676 (3d Cir. 1991).
The [UCC] offers a uniform body of law on a wide range of questions
likely to arise in computer software disputes: implied warranties,
consequential damages, disclaimers of liability, the statute of limitations, to
name a few. The importance of software to the commercial world and the
advantages to be gained by the uniformity inherent in the U.C.C. are strong
policy arguments favoring inclusion [of software within Article 2’s scope].
Id. (holding that software is within the scope of Article 2).
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early days144 compelled courts to consider software within the scope
of Article 2.145
Because of this history and the tendency early on to classify
software as a good, some courts continue to assume Article 2 applies
to software.146 The issue is even more apparent today with the
proliferation of software as a service, cloud computing, and smart
goods.147 Take this hypothetical as an example: a diabetic buys a
small mobile device containing an application that sends reminders to
inject insulin.148 If there is an issue with the product, applying the
predominant factor test to this scenario becomes very difficult
because of the product’s integrated hardware and software.149 In
particular, when evaluating the fourth factor of the analysis (the
nature of the final product delivered), a court might consider the
small mobile device an Article 2 transaction if the other factors are
also consistent.150
144. Towle, supra note 10, at 556.
145. See, e.g., Advent Systems Ltd., 925 F.2d at 674. The court in Advent stated:
Because software was a major portion of the “products” described
in the agreement, this matter requires some discussion. Computer systems
consist of “hardware” and “software.” Hardware is the computer
machinery, its electronic circuitry and peripheral items such as keyboards,
readers, scanners and printers. Software is a more elusive concept.
Generally speaking, “software” refers to the medium that stores input and
output data as well as computer programs. The medium includes hard
disks, floppy disks, and magnetic tapes.
In simplistic terms, programs are codes prepared by a programmer
that instruct the computer to perform certain functions. When the program
is transposed onto a medium compatible with the computer’s needs, it
becomes software . . . .
The increasing frequency of computer products as subjects of
commercial litigation has led to controversy over whether software is a
“good” or intellectual property . . . .
....
The importance of software to the commercial world and the
advantages to be gained by the uniformity inherent in the U.C.C. are strong
policy arguments favoring inclusion. The contrary arguments are not
persuasive, and we hold that software is a “good” within the definition of
the Code.
Id. at 674–76.
146. Towle, supra note 10, at 556.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 557.
149. Id.
150. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 745.
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The obvious criticism of this test is that by applying either the
UCC or common law to the entire contract, at least some subject
matter of the mixed transaction will be governed by the wrong law.151
Using the diabetic device example, the predominant factor test would
force the court to apply Article 2 to the entire transaction, including
the software and the insulin reminder software.152
As goods become smarter, continued use of the predominant factor
test will lead to “pretty awful results.”153 In some cases, the
application of Article 2 to software will often result in the violation
of federal law.154 Additionally, Article 2’s default warranty rules are
not adequately suited for the complexities of software.155 Because
Article 2 was drafted before software was commonplace and has not
been substantially amended since, applying Article 2—through the
use of the predominant factor test—will result in applying a law the
does not adequately account for the nature of software.156

151. Id.; see also Towle, supra note 10, at 558.
152. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 741.
153. Towle, supra note 10, at 558. Towle states:
As goods become “smarter” with included digital, genetic, or other
licensed information, new thinking is needed and lines will need to be
drawn to determine how to treat goods containing that information,
including embedded software. Use of a predominant purpose test will
inherently mislead, or eventually lead, to the “pretty awful results” . . . if
used to sweep information into UCC Article 2. Not surprisingly, the fact
that the revisions drafted in the 1990s for UCC Article 2 codified a
predominant purpose test was one of the reasons the revisions drew sharp
criticism. More appropriate gravamen of the action lines have already been
drawn for some modern circumstances, and more will develop over time
....
There are important differences that exist between goods and
information in law, practice, under intellectual property laws and even
under the First Amendment. Given those differences, a court fashioning the
resolution of a dispute should not simply apply Article 2 by analogy or
under a predominant purpose test, but rather should consider the issue . . . .
Id. at 558–59.
154. Id. at 559.
155. Id.
156. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 745–46.
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2. The Gravamen Test
The minority of jurisdictions apply the gravamen test, including
those that have adopted the UCITA.157 The gravamen test addresses
many of the concerns produced by the continued use of the
predominant factor test.158 Unlike the predominant factor test, which
applies one body of law based upon the analysis of factors,159 the
gravamen test applies law based on the subject matter of the
dispute.160 For example, a diabetic buys the device described in the
example above, the software reminder malfunctions, and the diabetic
is injured because he did not take his insulin. When the diabetic sues
for the software malfunction, the court can easily avoid Article 2 by
identifying the dispute as one of an intangible or service-based
nature.161
The gravamen of the dispute, however, will become more difficult
to identify as “technologies [continue to become] increasingly
intertwined.”162 The court may have trouble determining if the
software’s failure to deliver the insulin reminder was in fact caused
by a hardware defect. If the software failure was caused by a
hardware defect, the diabetic should be entitled to sue under breach
of implied warranty of merchantability.163 However, it could be hard
for courts to determine whether the gravamen of the dispute is the
good or the embedded software or service. It is “becoming
increasingly difficult to draw a clear distinction . . . even for
computer scientists.”164 The gravamen test is a tool courts developed
to classify hybrid contracts where the distinction between good and
service was much clearer.165 Accordingly, “new thinking is

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Kissman, supra note 2, at 571.
Id.
BMC Indus. v. Barth Indus., 160 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998).
Kissman, supra note 2, at 571.
Id.
Id.
See Brennan, supra note 58, at 473 n.49.
Kissman, supra note 2, at 571.
See Brennan, supra note 58, at 473.
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III. Proposal
All current solutions fail because they are retrofitted to the issue.
Smart goods emerged after the tests and doctrines around the hybrid
contract were formed and settled.167 Courts still struggle to use these
ill-suited tools to accomplish the task of classifying smart goods.168
The solution to this problem should be developed with a conscious
consideration of smart goods, not mere application after-the-fact. The
predominant factor test fails at this task primarily because it applies
one body of law to the entire contract, even if parts of the contract are
clearly outside the scope of Article 2.169 The gravamen test fails at
166. Towle, supra note 10, at 558.
167. ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 9, at 158–64.
168. Kissman, supra note 2, at 570–72. Kissman describes the issue:
Courts face [a dilemma] when dealing with mixed transactions that involve
goods and services. To determine the source of law that applies to these
mixed transactions, courts have developed different tests . . . Some
[commentators argue that the gravamen test] is more reasonable for
information transactions, and that the predominant purpose test renders
awkward results when applied to information transactions. On the other
hand, because emerging technologies have become increasingly
intertwined, some authors point out that it is becoming increasingly
difficult to draw a clear distinction between embedded and non-embedded
software, even for computer scientists . . . . [J]ust as the definition of
“information” can determine the applicable law, the mixed transaction test
that a court decides to apply can also have a significant impact on the
source of law that will govern a transaction, and thus the contractual rights
of the parties.
Id. at 571–72.
169. Towle, supra note 10, at 555. Towle writes:
The predominant purpose test is a judge-made rule and is the approach that
most courts use when a transaction involves a mixed subject matter—
typically a mixture of goods and services. The test holds that the court
should apply the contract law applicable to the subject matter that forms the
predominant purpose of the transaction and apply that contract law to the
entire transaction. The approach ensures that the intellectually wrong
contract law will apply to at least some of the subject matter of a mixed
transaction . . . . It is inappropriate for information transactions. In fact,
initial use of this test in software transactions contributed to the problem
that exists today—using the presence of a good in a transaction to subsume
all items even though some cry out for individual treatment.
Id. at 555–56.

Published by Reading Room, 2018

19

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 5

472

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

this task primarily because the actual “gravamen” of the dispute may
be impossible to determine.170 In some instances, the software might
have caused a malfunction in a tangible good; in other instances, the
hardware of the tangible good may have contributed to a software
malfunction. An easily-applied solution should address the failings of
these traditional tests to remove the ambiguity surrounding smart
good classification.
A. The Solution
The proposed solution has three steps. First, the court must
determine if the good in question is a smart good. If the good is not
“smart” or if there is no “good” component, then the court simply
applies either common law or Article 2 respectively. Second, if the
good is smart, and the litigation does not concern breach of warranty,
the smart good will be deemed inside the scope of Article 2. Third,
for litigation around a breach of warranty of a smart good, the court
will assess the practical effect of the defect. If the practical effect is
tangible, the smart good will be deemed inside the scope of Article 2.
1. Step One: Is It Smart?
The first step of the solution is the easiest to apply and the most
obvious. A smart good, for this solution, will be any tangible good
ordinarily within the scope of Article 2 containing some intangible
functionality which, taken alone, would be outside the scope of
Article 2. If the good is deemed a smart good, the analysis continues
to the next step. If the good is not smart, the inquiry ends, and Article
2 applies automatically.
2. Step Two: Is It Defective?
The second step addresses several issues inherent in the
predominant factor test. If the litigation is not for breach of warranty,
the smart good is automatically deemed within the scope of Article 2,
170. Kissman, supra note 2, at 570–71.
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despite the presence of embedded software. One major problem with
the predominant factor test is forcing the court to determine what was
actually bargained for.171 This is a complex endeavor when a smart
good’s software is just as important to the bargain as the hardware.
For example, a customer contracts to buy a smart good but the seller
never delivers. That simple breach of contract suit does not
necessitate the predominant factor analysis. The smart good is
powered off and in the box. The presence of embedded software
makes no difference. The UCC’s remedies for a buyer in the event of
a seller’s breach easily apply. For all breaches of contract, other than
those concerning functionality, the presence of embedded software
makes no difference. Article 2 should apply in those cases as though
the good was not smart.
3. Step Three: Is the Defect Tangible?
Step three addresses litigation concerning the smart good’s
functionality. The key concern is avoiding the application of the UCC
to issues it was never meant to govern. Article 2 was not designed to
provide remedies and warranties to contracts for intangibles.172
Article 2’s scope provision expressly limits the scope to things that
are “movable.”173 Labor, services, and modern software are settled as
being outside of Article 2’s scope.174 However, issues can arise with
the application of UCC Article 2 to modern smart goods containing
integrated software—for example, when the software in a refrigerator
makes it stop refrigerating. This issue is what the gravamen test tries
171. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 741. Gottlieb writes:
Courts routinely apply the predominant purpose test to software contracts
to determine if the UCC applies. Under that test, Article 2 governs when
the transaction at issue is predominantly for goods, while common law
applies when the transaction is predominantly for services. The U.S.
Supreme Court has yet to rule whether software is a good or service, and
“there is no national consensus” on the issue. And yet despite its
prevalence, the predominant purpose test has failed to assist courts in
adjudicating software contract disputes. As a result, software’s legal status
remains a fundamental yet unanswered question.
Id.
172. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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but fails to address.175 It is often unclear and very difficult to
determine what exactly caused the breach of warranty in a
litigation.176 Accordingly, step three of the analysis shifts the inquiry
from what caused the litigation to the actual litigated defect. This is a
subtle but important shift. Under this analysis, if the defect manifests
itself tangibly, then Article 2 applies. “Tangible” keeps its standard
definition: a thing that is perceptible by touch. This standard is easier
to apply than the gravamen test. Under the gravamen test, the court
endeavors to determine the cause of the litigation, its gravamen,177
which can be difficult “even for computer scientists.”178 Instead, this
test simply asks if the defect manifested itself tangibly. Even if the
defect originated in the software, a tangible manifestation will thrust
the contract into the scope of Article 2. If a hardware defect causes a
software malfunction or a software defect causes a software
malfunction, Article 2 will not apply to the litigation.
A basic example to illustrate this distinction is a refrigerator with
an embedded software operating system. Suppose a customer comes
home and realizes that his refrigerator stopped refrigerating. Under
the gravamen test, the court would endeavor to determine if the
defect was caused by the hardware or software.179 This could be
impossible to determine.180 And if the refrigeration ceased because of
a software defect, the court would not apply Article 2,181 despite its
clear effect on the function of the tangible good. Instead, under this
test, the court would not need to determine the root cause of the
malfunction. Regardless, whether the malfunction arose from the
hardware or software, the failure to refrigerate is a tangible
malfunction and should be governed by the implied warranties and
remedies available under Article 2. However, if the refrigerator
suddenly lost its ability to connect to the internet or post tweets, that

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Towle, supra note 10, at 558.
Id. at 556.
Kissman, supra note 2, at 570–71.
Id. at 571.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 572.
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intangible malfunction—whether caused by hardware or software—
should not be governed by Article 2.
The downside to this approach is that some hardware defects might
render a smart good useless if the defect is manifested as a software
malfunction. Some flawed circuitry, for example, would not be
covered under Article 2 if it impaired the software’s ability to
connect to the internet. In this particular example, the tangible part of
the good is causing an intangible malfunction. However, this is a
necessary downside for the overall clarity and consistency of this
approach. The whole purpose of the proposed solution is to avoid the
inquiry into what actually caused the defect. Because Article 2 of the
UCC was designed to provide warranties over defects of tangible
goods,182 that implicitly means that Article 2 was not meant to
address intangible defects. This will be less of a problem as
“technologies [continue to become] increasingly intertwined”183 and
the true cause of a smart good malfunction becomes increasingly
obfuscated. By limiting the tangible defect standard to only
litigations involving breach of warranty, ensuring Article 2 protection
for all other smart goods, the number of cases affected by this
apparent inconsistency will be much lower than with current
solutions.
B. The Implementation
The solution outlined above is restricted to the classification of
smart goods under Article 2. Therefore, it leaves open the possibility
of a future body of law to replace the ill-fated UCITA governing
information transactions. This solution also does not conflict with
any pre-existing or future software licensing law. Instead, the only
time Article 2 will govern a defect in information is when that defect
manifests itself in a tangible way that entitles the customer to an
Article 2 breach of warranty cause of action.
However, implementing this solution could prove challenging. The
most direct way of implementing this solution is to amend Article 2’s
182. See U.C.C. §§ 2-105(1), 2-314, 2-315, 2-316 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
183. Kissman, supra note 2, at 570–71.
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scope provision to include smart goods. Then, in the breach of
warranty provisions, the application of smart goods should be limited
to cases of manifested tangible defects. The official comments would
then describe the analysis for the court.
The challenge of this implementation is that the UCC is not black
letter law. The UCC provisions only become law once the states
adopt them.184 As with the UCITA, it is possible that only a few
states, or none at all, would adopt these modified provisions.
However, if the solution could make it past the scrutiny of the ALI
and the Uniform Law Commission (ULC)—a feat the UCITA was
unable to achieve185—the states would likely adopt the changes.
Individual states could implement their own adaptations of Article
2 including the altered smart good scope and warranty provisions.
However, this implementation is less desirable for two reasons. First,
the goal of the UCC is to provide a uniform set of regulations for the
sale of goods.186 If states start haphazardly implementing a tweaked
184. Id. at 594.
185. Henning, supra note 11, at 135–36. Henning writes:
The [group of drafters] came tantalizingly close [to ratifying the UCITA].
[At the drafters’ annual meeting in 1999, the drafters were] inundated with
letters of objection, primarily from industry stakeholders. There was even a
full page ad in USA Today urging that the draft be rejected. The floor
debate began after a long and difficult debate over UCITA, and it
consumed so much time that it threatened to derail other important projects.
As it was apparent that even if the debate continued it would not produce a
product that could successfully gain widespread enactment, NCCUSL’s
leadership, in consultation with the leadership of the ALI, made the
controversial decision to stop the debate. [UCITA’s scope issues could
never be resolved and the UCITA ultimately died.]
Id.
186. Malcolm, supra note 14, at 229–30. Malcolm writes:
One problem is the disparity among the laws . . . uniformity or harmony
would permit business and society to function more easily. It is against this
general background that a report on a major effort of unification of the law
in the United States culminating in the production of the new Uniform
Commercial Code may be found timely. The Uniform Commercial Code,
hammered out by lawyers, judges and law teachers dedicated to clarity and
good business sense in commercial law, has brought together into one
coherent statement the best laws and practices prevalent in the United
States. Both the procedures by which this Code was developed and the
contents of the Code which, it is hoped, will soon be the law in all states of
the Union . . . .
Id. at 226–27.
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definition of Article 2’s scope, fragmentation and unpredictability
would spread across the nation. Second, although many states often
tweak the ULC and ALI sanctioned versions, the issue of smart
goods is very complex. It would be prudent for states to let a solution
pass through the scrutiny of the ALI before implementing their own
individual, complex solutions. Finally, implementing individual state
adaptations would require courts to ignore or overturn precedent.
Even if they tried, there would be no uniformity within a state unless
the state’s supreme court issued a ruling establishing this solution.
Even then, fragmentation among the states would still persist.
Therefore, an amended Article 2, vetted by the ALI and adopted by
the states, is the best way to implement this solution.
CONCLUSION
Legal scholars were aware in the 1990s that transactions in
information would grow in popularity. Even during the drafting of
the UCITA, scholars hotly debated the classification of a theoretical
smart good. Unfortunately, although Article 2 and Article 2B were to
complement each other, Article 2B (UCITA) never garnered the
necessary support. Article 2 forged ahead alone, with the
classification of smart goods never resolved. The line between
software and hardware continues to blur. The common law
approaches used to fill the void left by the failed UCITA in resolving
smart good classification grow evermore antiquated.
This Note proposes that courts perform a three-part test when
determining whether UCC Article 2 applies to a smart good. First,
Article 2 shall apply to any smart good in a litigation for anything
other than breach of warranty. Second, if the cause of action is breach
of warranty, whether expressed or implied, the body of law which
shall apply to the contract will be Article 2. Third, Article 2 will only
apply if the alleged nonconformity is a tangible defect.
Article 2 can provide implied warranties and remedies to
customers injured by tangible defects. It is only when the defect is
intangible that the controversy leaves the scope of Article 2. If this
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proposal passes the scrutiny of the ALI and the ULC and is uniformly
adopted by states, the ambiguity will finally be resolved, and the door
will remain open for a comprehensive body of law to finish what the
UCITA never could.
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